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A Brief Political Economy of Energy Subsidies in 
the Middle East and North Africa
Laura El-Katiri and Bassam Fattouh1
Abstract
Energy subsidies are among the most pervasive and controversial fiscal policy tools 
used in the Middle East and North Africa (mena). In a region with few functioning 
social welfare systems, subsidised energy prices continue to form an important social 
safety net, albeit a highly costly and inefficient one. In the mena region’s oil and gas 
producing countries, low energy prices have also historically formed an important ele-
ment of an unwritten social contract, where governments have extracted their coun-
tries’ hydrocarbon riches in return for citizens’ participation in sharing resource rents. 
While it is clear that energy subsidy reform will not be the only variable at play, its 
potential socio-economic dividends are important factors for enabling some common 
regional objectives—sustainable fiscal policies, fiscal space to invest in key areas, and 
a more efficient and equitable distribution of scarce resources—to be achieved, help-
ing to promote a more stable political status quo in the long term. If accommodated by 
effective mitigation measures, reforming energy subsidies in the mena region’s middle- 
income economies could be a powerful tool for governments—addressing those very 
profound socio-economic grievances that have contributed to the outbreak of political 
protest and, in some cases, to an intensification of domestic infighting over political 
control. In this paper, we look at some of the mena region’s potential avenues for re-
form. While the past has demonstrated the political difficulty of reforming energy pric-
es, recent experience also shows that the reform of energy subsidies can be achieved, if 
accompanied by a set of enabling factors.
1 Introduction
Energy subsidies are among the most pervasive and controversial fiscal policy 
tools in the Middle East and North Africa (mena). Their reform continues to 
be difficult, from a political, economic and social perspective, due to the origi-
nal objectives of these measures—such as the need to protect the interests of 
1 A version of this article was published as working paper (https://www.oxfordenergy.org/ 
wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/MEP-11.pdf).
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low-income households and to foster domestic industrial growth. In a region 
with few functioning social welfare systems, subsidised energy prices continue 
to form an important social safety net, albeit a highly costly and inefficient 
one. In the mena region’s oil and gas producing countries, low domestic en-
ergy prices have also historically formed an important element of an unwrit-
ten social contract, where governments extract their countries’ hydrocarbon 
riches, in return compensating their citizens through a variety of direct and in-
direct channels, including subsidies and other welfare benefits (El-Katiri et al., 
2012; El-Katiri, 2013a). Energy subsidies hence play a pivotal role in a complex 
state–citizen relationship, a relationship that has come under increasing scru-
tiny in many Arab countries since the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2010.
The four years or more since protests erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, 
and the widespread regional unrest later summarised under the popularised 
term the ‘Arab Spring’, have placed the issue of greater socio-economic justice 
at the heart of mena politics. In a way this has complicated, and in many cases 
delayed, overdue energy pricing reforms in a number of regional economies, as 
governments have feared that rising living costs would only intensify popular 
turmoil. On the other hand, despite being widely perceived as a fundamental 
economic and social benefit, energy subsidies form an important part of the 
socio-economic problems, and of the vastly distorted economic incentives, 
that plague the economies of the mena region. The reform of energy pricing 
systems is also a complex process, which often requires structural changes to 
ownership and control over some of the most crucial assets of the state in the 
Middle East—oil, gas and electricity, together with their accompanying distri-
bution infrastructure and networks. In lower- and middle-income countries, 
measures for reforming energy prices, if not accompanied by appropriate 
mitigation measures (such as a more effective and transparent social safety 
system), have an adverse effect on the disposable incomes of the poor and the 
aspiring middle classes.
There are also intra-regional differences behind the drivers of reform. The 
fiscal pressures associated with energy subsidies are a primary driver for re-
form in many of the region’s lower- and middle-income countries, particularly 
those in need of financial support from international institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (imf). But the recent de-
cline in international oil prices (since the second half of 2014), coupled with 
rising fiscal break-even prices in many oil-exporting countries, has also provid-
ed relatively strong incentives for the wealthier oil and gas producers to con-
sider their respective domestic energy-pricing frameworks. This is in addition 
to the long-term consequences that many oil producers face as they continue 
to divert increasing volumes of oil and gas away from export markets to satisfy 
rapidly growing domestic demand, at prices far below world market levels.
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In this paper, we look at some of the mena region’s potential avenues for 
reform. While the past has demonstrated the political difficulty of reforming 
energy prices, recent experiences in several mena economies also show that 
the reform of energy subsidies can be achieved, if accompanied by a set of 
enabling factors. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides 
a brief background on energy subsidies in the mena region; Section 3 looks at 
some of the reform experiences in the region; Section 4 concludes.
2 A Brief Background on Energy Subsidies
2.1 Issues with Measuring Energy Subsidies
Energy subsidies are neither straightforward to define nor simple to measure; 
this tends to complicate any meaningful debate around them. There is no 
commonly agreed definition of what constitutes a subsidy, and this fact—in 
part—is reflected in the continued inability of major international organisa-
tions such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
(undp), and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec) to 
agree on common terms.2 A widely used definition considers a subsidy as:
… any measure that keeps prices for consumers below the market level or 
keeps prices for producers above the market level, or that reduces costs 
for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support.
de moor and calamai, �997, �
It is clear from the above definition that many governments’ actions can be 
categorised as involving assistance, including subsidies (in-kind, cash or cred-
it, or relating to tax or procurement). Some of these are on-budget or explicit 
subsidies that constitute explicit transfers made by the government to either 
the producer or the consumer receiving the subsidy, registered in the state’s 
budget. For instance, a government may mandate that a public utility set the 
selling price below the cost of production. The government then finances that 
public utility’s losses by transferring funds from the general budget.3 Energy 
2 iea et al. (2010) notes the existence of a major disagreement among international organ-
isations concerning the choice of the reference price, and that consequently ‘a commonly 
agreed definition of subsidies has proven a major challenge in the G-20 context and coun-
tries have decided to adopt their own definition of energy subsidies’.
3 The budget records of many countries (including Egypt) show how this concept underlies 
the measurement of subsidies in the economy.
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subsidies can also be cross-financed between different energy user groups. 
Cross-subsidies occur when tariffs below the cost of production are charged, 
to household users for instance, and the revenue shortfall is offset by increas-
ing industrial/commercial sector tariffs above cost levels. Countries such as 
Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Syria all charge their industrial customers 
considerably higher electricity prices than charged to residential customers, 
suggesting some form of cross-subsidisation.4
But there is also the question of the benchmark against which domestic pric-
es should be compared. For instance, the national oil company can be man-
dated to sell petroleum products to the domestic market at below international 
prices but above production costs. In this case, the national oil company does 
not incur financial losses, and hence the government does not need to make 
an explicit transfer to compensate for those losses. Nevertheless, there is still 
an implicit cost involved, which represents the opportunity cost (the economic 
rent/revenue wasted by the failure to sell oil at higher, market prices). This en-
tails a transfer from the government to the final consumers, even though such 
a transfer does not appear explicitly on state oil companies’ records or in the 
government budget. If this foregone revenue had been collected, it could have 
been used by the government in a variety of ways, including to reduce the bud-
get deficit and the size of the public debt; to increase expenditure in more pro-
ductive areas such as infrastructure, education or health; by redistributing it 
directly to its people through cash transfers; or to reduce, where applicable, tax-
ation (Gupta et al., 2003). Implicit subsidies are less transparent and more diffi-
cult to calculate. They typically occur in oil producing countries, where mostly 
state-owned oil companies produce, refine and market petroleum products.
Based on the price-gap approach—which measures the gap between the 
subsidised price and a benchmark price to reflect the opportunity cost (de-
fined as the supply cost of an energy product including transport and distri-
bution costs)—a recent imf report estimates pre-tax energy subsidies in the 
mena region as having reached usd 237 billion in 2011, equivalent to 48 per 
cent of world subsidies, 8.6 per cent of regional gdp, and 22 per cent of gov-
ernment revenue (Sdralevich et al., 2014). These figures, however, should be 
treated with caution given the many caveats to using the price-gap approach 
in some contexts. Issues such as the production of joint products (for instance 
crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids (ngls)), the availability of spare 
capacity in some Arab oil-producing countries, and the ability of key Arab oil 
4 Since in all these countries public utilities do not recover their costs, this form of cross-




exporters to influence international oil prices could affect the measurement 
of subsidies.5 A recent study by the imf broadens the definition of an energy 
subsidy to:
… [a post-tax energy subsidy, which arises] when consumer prices are 
below supply costs plus a tax to reflect environmental damage and an 
additional tax applied to all consumption goods to raise government 
revenues.
coady et al., �0�5, �
Based on this definition, global energy subsidies are estimated at a massive 
usd 5.3 trillion for 2015, or 6.5 per cent of global gdp, despite the recent fall in 
the oil price. This higher estimate of global energy subsidies results from the 
inclusion of components such as local air pollution, global warming, and other 
(non-internalised) domestic externalities in the post-tax energy price.
2.2 Energy Subsidies and mena Fiscal Stability
As has become evident throughout the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, energy subsidies constitute a significant fiscal burden. With rising world 
 market prices for oil and natural gas since the turn of the new millennium, the 
mena region’s parallel surge in domestic demand has translated into a rapid 
growth in fiscal expenditure on energy subsidies in importing countries such 
as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Egypt’s expenditure on energy 
subsidies reached a staggering usd 21 billion (egp 143.7 billion) in the financial 
year 2013/14—a figure equivalent to 19.5 per cent of total government spending, 
or almost the entire value of aid received by Egypt from Middle Eastern donors 
since mid-2012.6 Yemen’s energy subsidy bill for 2013/14 was most recently es-
timated to be around usd 3.5 billion, a third of government expenditure and 
in excess of the country’s budgeted deficit of usd 3.2 billion in that fiscal year 
(mees, 2014h; Ghobari and El Gamal, 2014). The recent fall in the oil price comes 
as a welcome relief to these oil importers, but such relief could prove tempo-
rary, given that the future trajectory of oil prices remains highly uncertain.
5 A report notes that the price-gap method has limitations, which apply particularly in the 
case of countries with large endowments of energy resources (iea et al., 2010).
6 mees (2014a); authors’ estimates of Gulf and Turkish aid paid to Egypt since the Morsi re-
gime assumed power until February 2014 (around usd 24.5 billion). It is important to note 
that in measuring energy subsidies, Egypt only considers the actual expenditure on subsidies 
and not the opportunity cost. Based on the opportunity cost, the size of the subsidy would be 
much higher.
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A parallel problem related to current energy pricing in oil and gas produc-
ing countries—and in countries, such as Egypt, that are net importers of some 
fuels—is the medium- and long-term effect that current pricing policies have 
on these countries’ own domestic production, and hence on their future rev-
enue streams. Low domestic energy prices in many oil and gas producing coun-
tries provide a poor incentive for independent oil and gas companies to invest 
in new exploration and upstream development projects. Natural gas is the en-
ergy source most affected by domestic pricing policies—reflected in the poor 
fiscal terms offered to oil and gas companies considering investment opportu-
nities. This will become increasingly important as a larger proportion of Mid-
dle East oil and gas becomes more expensive to produce. The development of 
gas reserves has hence lagged decades behind the Middle East’s massive gas re-
source endowment undermining the long-term supply potential of the region.
The mena economies’ exceptionally high reliance on oil and natural gas—
tradable fossil fuels whose world market prices fluctuate significantly—has also 
made the region highly vulnerable to international commodity price cycles. 
Energy subsidies have also been shown to be strong, procyclical ‘destabilisers’ 
in oil- and gas-importing countries across mena, as government spending on 
subsidies increases during economic boom times along with  rising demand, 
and declines as economic activity falls (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 21–22; imf, 2013, 
37–40). Several studies have demonstrated the negative consequences of pro-
cyclical spending in developing economies (Lane, 2003; Abdih et al., 2010; 
Kaminsky et al. 2004; Erbil, 2011), including the effect of commodity cycles on 
political stability over the medium and long term.7
2.3 Energy Subsidies and Social Equity
The widespread use of energy subsidies in developing countries continues to 
be widely defended on the basis of social security and ensuring access to en-
ergy. However, energy subsidies are largely inequitable as they naturally accrue 
most to the largest users—energy-intensive industries and middle- to high- 
income households.8 Petroleum product subsidies in particular benefit pri-
marily the urban middle class, and households that can afford a car. In a recent 
study, the imf found that the poorest quintiles in Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Yemen receive only about 1–7 per cent of total diesel subsidies, 
while the richest quintiles receive subsidies to the tune of 42–77 per cent of 
7 E.g. Collier and Hoeffler (1998).
8 This also, where applicable, relates to natural gas/LPG. Kerosene, by contrast, tends to be 
proportionately consumed most by lower-income households, although substantial leakages 
exist to higher income groups. See e.g. Alderman (2002); Clements et al. (2003); Coady et 
al. (2006); Hope and Singh (1999).
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the total. In Egypt, the poorest 40 per cent of the population receives only 3 per 
cent of direct gasoline subsidies, 7 per cent of natural gas subsidies, and 10 per 
cent of diesel subsidies (Sdralevich et al., 2014).
Energy subsidies, many of which leak to higher income groups and indus-
tries, could otherwise have been invested in alternative channels—free public 
health and education, infrastructure improvements, or alternative tax reduc-
tions for small and medium-sized businesses. All these would provide sub-
stantially higher social and economic returns than perceived citizen benefits 
bound to energy consumption. Separate funds could have been spent targeting 
low-income households more effectively, for instance, through comprehensive 
social safety nets. In some mena countries, the size of energy subsidies rela-
tive to other forms of expenditure is staggering.9 In Egypt, total government 
expenditure on energy subsidies in 2008 equalled combined expenditure on 
health and education; as did fuel subsidies in Jordan prior to the country’s 2008 
reform of fuel prices. Yemen’s budgeted expenditure on fuel subsidies in 2008 
amounted to more than 34 per cent of total government expenditure—more 
than one and a-half times the expenditure on education and health combined 
(Breisinger et al., 2011).
The widespread use of energy subsidies also affects the rate of investment 
in the energy sector in parts of mena; the quality of coverage of different en-
ergy services, including fuel supply and electricity, consequently affects social 
groups differently. Caps on government subsidies paid to producers, or flat 
payment subsidies, often may not fully compensate domestic oil/gas produc-
ers, refineries, importers and distributors, and electricity producers for their 
incurred losses, and may undermine the rate of return on their investment. 
When funds are diverted away from state-owned enterprises and oil marketing 
companies and distributors, these companies will not be able to upgrade their 
internal capabilities, invest in new infrastructure, or shift to modern, cleaner, 
and more efficient technologies. The result is often the provision of low-quality 
services to end users, most visibly in the region’s electricity sector.
Recurring power outages have characterised electricity provision through-
out wide parts of mena, typically due to decade-long underinvestment in elec-
tricity generation and in transmission and distribution networks. In many parts 
of the Levant and the Gulf, this situation is further exacerbated by a culture 
9 The imf reports that in about half of mena countries, total pre-tax energy subsidies 
were higher than capital spending in 2011. In all oil exporters, total pre-tax energy subsi-
dies exceeded spending on education and on health, while in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon 
spending on total pre-tax energy subsidies was higher than spending on capital, health, or 
education. In 2008, Egypt dedicated 11.93% of its gross annual expenditure to education, 
5.94% to health, and an estimated 17.85% to fuel subsidies. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012b).
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of non-payment of utility bills by some parts of the population. Recurring 
blackouts, seen in recent years across many parts of the Levant, Iraq, Egypt, 
and perhaps most paradoxically in several Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) 
member states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (uae)), are just one of the most visible consequences of lagging 
new investment and insufficient capacity across many parts of mena. These 
blackouts proportionally affect middle-income households and small busi-
nesses significantly more than any other energy-consumer group. Long waiting 
times for new electricity connections for private households and businesses 
are often the consequence, resulting in annual losses in foregone business ac-
tivity and backup costs for the economies concerned (World Bank, 2008).
For some of the poorest parts of mena, however, the consequences of un-
derinvestment and a lack of electricity grid access are staggering. Lack of elec-
trification in remote areas can be seen primarily in Yemen and in some rural 
parts of Morocco. In Yemen, little more than half the population has access to 
electricity, as the chronically underfunded state utility has insufficient funds 
to invest in expanding the country’s electricity grid and generation capacity 
(Breisinger et al., 2011; El-Katiri and Fattouh, 2011). Of those households with 
electricity access, which are entirely concentrated in the wealthier former 
North, nearly 70 per cent are on ‘lifeline rates’, supposedly enabling electricity 
access for low-income households. Yemen’s case painfully illustrates the highly 
regressive nature of energy subsidies.
Continued significant fuel price differences between neighbouring coun-
tries in mena, owing to different subsidy regimes, have also incentivised large-
scale fuel smuggling across borders. Fuel smuggling has been of particular 
concern among neighbouring countries in the Levant, such as Syria, Jordan, 
and Lebanon; between Egypt and the Palestinian territories; across the closed 
borders between Algeria and Morocco and between Tunisia and Libya (result-
ing from the 2011 uprisings) (Algerie dz, 2008; France 24, 2011); into and from 
Iraq and neighbouring countries; and from and to Yemen (Wahab, 2006; Ibra-
him, 2011). Iran, with (up to end-2010) some of the world’s lowest prices for fuel, 
has suffered from endemic cross-border fuel smuggling to all its neighbours, a 
problem also incurred by other Gulf States (Arab Times, 2011). Fuel smuggling 
not only contributes to illegal contraband trade at the expense of the domes-
tic economy, but in many cases substantially exacerbates existing fuel short-
ages in subsidising countries, as seen most recently in Yemen (mees, 2014h; 
Ghobari and El Gamal, 2014).
2.4 Energy Subsidies and Domestic Energy Consumption
While high revenues and foreign assets are currently shielding many of the 
mena region’s larger oil and gas exporters in the short term, energy exporters 
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face a longer-term challenge related to the way in which their current pricing 
policies affect their domestic energy consumption. The pivotal role played 
by national hydrocarbon resources in the development of many large mena 
oil and gas producers has deeply affected the way energy features as a critical 
component in the citizen–state relationship. Oil wealth has facilitated much of 
the modern-day socio-economic development in the region, particularly that 
of the very oil-rich Gulf monarchies. Rather than engaging in more democratic 
forms of government, many of these countries’ traditional political systems are 
based on the state’s central role as a distributor or allocator of wealth in return 
for political legitimacy (Luciani, 1987; El-Katiri, 2013a).
The perceived abundance of energy resources, guaranteed by the state, and 
coupled to the state’s role as a provider for its citizens, has historically been 
enshrined in some of the world’s lowest prices for fuel, natural gas, and elec-
tricity. These in-kind citizen benefits, which also fuelled many oil producers’ 
industrial expansion towards energy-intensive industries during the 1960s and 
1970s, are supplemented by often generous welfare systems that have become 
an effective element in these states’ political stability over several decades.
Low domestic energy prices have led to a surge in regional energy con-
sumption—beyond the influence of such factors as economic and population 
growth. With regional energy consumption having more than quadrupled in 
less than 30 years (authors’ calculations based on World Bank, 2014), the mena 
region is now one of the world’s fastest growing energy markets, and is forecast 
to become the second most important driving force of global energy demand 
after Asia in the period to 2040 (iea, 2011; eia, 2011). Saudi Arabia is already the 
world’s twelfth-largest energy consumer, and the sixth-largest consumer of oil 
and natural gas, with oil consumption alone having more than doubled over 
the past ten years (based on bp and eia statistics). Other large regional oil and 
gas producers in the Gulf follow this pattern, albeit with smaller populations, 
and are leading the world’s league tables in terms of per capita living standards.
The fiscal problems arising from current consumption patterns that remain 
tied to current pricing policies in mena’s oil and gas producers in the long 
term are related to the way in which most of these states finance their spend-
ing. Many of these countries do not tax their domestic citizens, but finance 
themselves to an overwhelming extent on the basis of export revenues for their 
valuable oil and natural gas resources—the level of this dependence ranges 
from around 60 per cent of total government revenues in Qatar to over 90 per 
cent in countries such as Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Fattouh and 
El-Katiri, 2012a, 3). A further increase in already generous welfare handouts 
(for background, see El-Katiri, L., 2013a; El-Katiri, M., 2013; Gause iii, 2013) has 
also allowed the oil- and gas-rich Gulf monarchies to avoid Arab Spring-style 
political upheaval. This modus operandi works as long as sufficient volumes 
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of hydrocarbon exports are available. However, some studies have shown that 
under the business-as-usual scenario (where domestic demand keeps increas-
ing at a robust pace and the gcc governments fail to diversify their economies) 
export capability could be eroded, leading to a collapse of these countries’ rev-
enue base, with detrimental political consequences.10 Recent falling oil prices, 
if they persist, will make the need for an adjustment of spending patterns (in-
cluding a reform of energy subsidies) increasingly urgent.
The mena region’s low energy prices have also had many unintended con-
sequences, including the very high and (countering trends virtually every-
where else in the world) rising energy intensity of mena economies, meaning 
that more energy per unit of economic output is needed in these economies 
than anywhere else in the world.11 This is partly because the concentration of 
economic activity around energy-intensive industries in mena’s oil-producing 
countries has diverted much investment from other economic sectors. Howev-
er, the high energy intensity of mena economies is also due to inefficiencies in 
energy use across the region.12 A recent abb study, comparing energy efficien-
cy rates in power generation across a range of countries globally, shows that 
mena energy producers such as the uae, Libya and Saudi Arabia are among the 
world’s least energy-efficient countries in terms of domestic power generation 
10 Simulations of Saudi Arabia’s domestic oil demand, such as those conducted by Chatham 
House and Citibank, show the potential for Saudi Arabia—under a business-as-usual 
 scenario—to exhaust its own domestic reserve base in just 15–20 years, turning itself ulti-
mately into a net importer of oil, unless alternative policy options are pursued. (Lahn and 
Stevens, 2011; Daya and El Baltaji, 2012). See also El-Katiri, L. (2013b).
11 Total primary energy consumption per dollar of gdp (an indicator of energy intensity) 
over the past three decades has declined in all parts of the world, with the exception 
of mena. Energy intensity growth rates in several mena economies, including the uae, 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, have risen particularly fast, more than tripling in the uae and 
Saudi Arabia since 1980. This growth is not a Gulf phenomenon alone, however; energy 
intensity in several other economies, including Jordan, Egypt and Syria, also increased by 
more than a third over the same time period. Egypt and several Mashreq economies—
including Jordan—whose industries are generally less energy intensive, still require over 
40% more energy per unit of economic output than do some of the world’s less energy-
intensive economies, such as Denmark or Spain. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2013).
12 In a recent article, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman Al-Saud argues that ‘Although this growth 
in demand is partially attributed to the industrial growth and growing economic prosper-
ity in the kingdom, a rather significant portion of it results from the inefficient use of ener-
gy; deeming this accelerated growth unsustainable. Whereas the vast majority of countries 
have managed to lower the energy intensity of their economies, the kingdom’s energy in-
tensity increased significantly over the last two decades. Hence, it is a strategic imperative 
for the kingdom that energy efficiency becomes a major topic for all decisions related to an 
increase in demand for fuel and feedstock’. (Al-Saud, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman, 2014, 4).
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(abb, 2014). However, mena’s net-importers of energy, including Jordan, Leba-
non and Morocco, fare little better, comparing unfavourably to other develop-
ing economies, including those in Latin America. Similar conclusions apply to 
the region’s rapidly growing transport sector, where average fuel consumption 
per vehicle across the Middle East is more than twice the average of countries 
without fuel subsidies.13
Low energy prices for regionally produced oil and natural gas have also af-
fected the composition of the mena economies’ domestic energy mix. While 
these economies have historically not faced the same incentives as consumer 
countries in Europe and North America to diversify their domestic energy 
mix away from fossil fuels (for domestic energy security reasons) they may 
well have overlooked the economic potential of alternative energies such as 
renewable energy sources and nuclear power, given the influence of some of 
the world’s lowest domestic prices for fossil fuels (El-Katiri, 2014; El-Katiri and 
Husain, 2014). As a result, the mena economies remain dependent on oil and 
natural gas for a staggering 95 per cent of their domestic energy needs; more 
than any other region in the world (El-Katiri (2014) based on World Bank (2014) 
data). Their lack of diversity in domestic energy sources has left many mena 
energy importers exceptionally exposed to commodity price cycles and to 
surging world market prices for oil and natural gas.
Recent evidence from Kuwait shows that a realignment of prices at, or clos-
er to, the market price level confers a benefit on current and future generations 
of Kuwaitis (in terms of fiscal savings) that outweighs the impact of raising 
consumers’ electricity and water prices to market price levels.14 Such studies 
also underline the tremendous potential for economic savings to be made, in-
cluding through the reduction of deadweight loss.
3 Reforming Energy Subsidies in mena
Although energy subsidies are an inefficient and regressive distribution meth-
od, their reduction or elimination is a delicate economic and political task that 
13 Notably, the Middle East region in this context includes Iran, which until 2010 was widely 
cited as the single largest subsidiser of domestic fuels in the world. (Bressand et al., 2007).
14 See Fattouh and Mahadeva (2014). The authors show that in the market price scenario 
with consumer prices at about ten times current levels, there is a total fiscal cost of about 
a third of the value of fuel input used in the power sector (or about 1.5% of gdp), entirely 
due to the cash transfer. This, however, is just less than a fifth of the fiscal cost of the cur-
rent low-price regime, and in principle represents a massive saving. The net benefit of 
moving to market prices is 6.3% of gdp.
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requires considerable skill and political will. Without appropriate compensa-
tory programmes and without effective state capacity to provide public goods 
such as public transport networks and social welfare for the poorer segments 
of a society, energy price increases following reform will impact real incomes 
and could become a very potent source of public anger and social unrest. Nota-
bly, energy pricing reform affects not only the poor, but also the mena region’s 
aspiring middle class, and the region’s industries. This is all the more concern-
ing for oil and gas producing countries, whose industrial base is often highly 
energy intensive, and for whose populations the ownership of a car is a critical 
sign of social progress.
The economic lock-in effect of energy subsidies in mena countries is fur-
ther reinforced by strong coalition-building by groups who benefit from 
 current pricing systems—in particular industrial groups, but also members 
of current sociopolitical elites, who tend to have little interest in supporting 
public spending reforms. The Arab Spring affected the region’s political cli-
mate, deterring meaningful reform of domestic energy pricing policies across 
the mena region due to widespread government concern that the fear of ris-
ing living costs, associated with subsidy reform, could stir up further popular 
discontent. Nevertheless, reform efforts have become much more common in 
mena than expected, providing a wealth of experience around the ‘how and 
when’ of regional subsidy reform (Sdralevich et al., 2014, 44–55).
3.1 Gradual Reform Efforts in the Levant and North Africa
Fear of incitement of a popular backlash has kept those mena countries that 
were largely unaffected by Arab Spring-style unrest cautious of energy pricing 
reform. In spite of remaining largely unaffected by street protests, in compari-
son with countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan both rolled 
back reforms following the ousting of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidencies 
in 2011 and the outbreak of political protest across many other parts of the re-
gion. Both Morocco and Jordan are imf debtors who, a few years previously, had 
initiated tentative reforms to reduce domestic energy subsidies. Jordan had, 
for instance, made several attempts to reform the domestic prices of food and 
energy—in 2008 its government announced a programme of domestic energy 
price liberalisation. However, the reform stalled and was reversed in January 
2011, when the government decided to cut food and fuel prices in response to 
political protests seen in neighbouring countries. In an unexpected gesture of 
cross-regional solidarity between Arab monarchies, the wealthy gcc states ex-
tended an invitation to the kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan to join the Gulf Co-
operation Council, and subsequently increased their level of assistance to both 
countries, in the form of advantageous loans and unconditional development 
aid. This helped both countries initially withstand calls from international 
El-Katiri and Fattouh70
<UN>
lending organisations for further fiscal reforms (mees, 2011; mees, 2012a; 
mees, 2013; mees, 2014e).
A year on from the Arab Spring, however, domestic energy subsidy reform 
was back on the agendas of several North African and Levantine energy im-
porters. Jordan’s rapidly rising fuel imports—partly due to declining gas im-
ports from Egypt, which has since been struggling to supply its own domestic 
market—subsequently contributed to a skyrocketing energy subsidy bill that 
eventually reached 40 per cent of total government spending. Faced with lim-
ited room for manoeuvre, the Jordanian government was forced to curb pub-
lic spending significantly—including that on fuel subsidies—as part of a usd 
2.05 billion standby arrangement with the imf; one aim of this arrangement 
was to help the kingdom recover from the economic strains associated with 
the mass inflow of Syrian refugees, a result of the political crisis in neighbour-
ing Syria (mees, 2012c). But Jordan’s reform efforts were not exclusively ex-
ternally driven; the repercussions of the Arab Spring had made fiscal reforms 
practically unavoidable if political and economic stability were to be main-
tained. This was a small but significant turning point in the way in which many 
governments have since come to see energy subsidy reform.
Jordan’s November 2012 decision to gradually lift all petroleum product 
subsidies—later followed by the lifting of lpg and electricity subsidies—was 
painful, and faced considerable opposition both in parliament and on Am-
man’s streets. Street chants denouncing the Jordanian king led to a series of 
confrontations between protesters and the police. Having withstood this initial 
opposition, Jordan has since progressed with its reforms, following a gradual 
drying-up of popular opposition to them. The government’s response included 
a series of television and newspaper interviews underlining the government’s 
need to reduce the burden of subsidies, or otherwise ‘face catastrophe and 
insolvency’.15 In an effort to mitigate the effects of fuel price increases on Jor-
danian families, the government announced that within a week of the reform 
poor Jordanian households (below an annual household income of usd 14,100 
(Jordanian dinar ( jod) 10,000)) would receive a direct cash handout of usd 
99 ( jod 70); in effect around 70 per cent of the population would receive cash 
transfers. Electricity tariffs for individual economic sectors and high-income 
households have been increased a further three times since May 2012—part 
of a strategy to ensure the return of the National Electric Power Company 
nepco, Jordan’s national electric power company, to cost recovery over the 
medium term.
15 Prime Minister Abd Allah al-Nusur said, ‘If the move [had been] delayed, we would have 
faced a catastrophe and insolvency’. (mees, 2012c).
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The interim results of the reform have been largely positive; alongside other 
fiscal reforms, energy subsidy reforms helped reduce the Jordanian govern-
ment’s deficit from 14.5 per cent of gdp in 2011 to around 8.3 per cent of gdp in 
2014. As a result, Jordan’s access to lending from international capital markets 
has markedly improved (imf, 2014a).
Morocco decided to freeze energy prices in 2011 in spite of the high and ris-
ing level of global oil prices and the country’s dependence on imported en-
ergy for virtually all of its domestic energy needs. The move came largely as a 
direct response to popular protests in neighbouring North African countries 
and to—in small numbers and for a short period of time—protests on its own 
streets. This decision soon led to a rapidly ballooning energy subsidy bill. By 
the end of 2012, Morocco’s energy subsidy bill had become
… almost the size of the overall fiscal deficit, as much as spending on 
investment, and more than the spending on health and education 
combined.
imf, �0�4b, �6
An initial round of energy price rises reduced the cost of subsidies by nearly 
half to—still—around usd 4.1 billion, or 10 per cent of government spend-
ing in 2013 (mees, 2014f). Agreeing with the imf to reduce the fiscal burden 
of subsidies in return for a usd 6.2 billion imf Precautionary and Liquidity 
Line in August 2012, Morocco announced far-reaching domestic pricing re-
form for petroleum products between late 2013 and early 2014. Morocco’s case 
is interesting as it is one of the few mena countries that not only raised prices 
for domestic fuel products, but actually linked them on a permanent basis to 
international prices. Price adjustments are made twice monthly by the Minis-
try of General Affairs and Governance, independently from the ministries of 
Energy and of Electricity.16
In order to avoid any political backlash from this reform effort (having faced 
mass popular protests during the 1980s when it attempted to raise prices for 
basic foodstuffs), Morocco implemented a comprehensive and fairly well- 
orchestrated communication strategy to accompany the reform. This includ-
ed public tv and radio discussions, newspaper articles, advertisements, and 
debates explaining in remarkable and easily understood detail the economic 
reasons for the reform of prices, the different reform steps, the reason for link-
ing prices to a regularly reviewed international price index, and the multiple 
16 For the law governing this arrangement, see Royaume du Maroc (2013).
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benefits of reform to society as a whole17 (including the availability of more 
money for investment elsewhere18). The government also assured the popula-
tion of what benefits would remain: electricity prices, already among the re-
gion’s highest, initially remained unchanged, but were increased in July 2014 
(nearly a year after the indexation system was launched) as part of the govern-
ment’s restructuring of the Office National de l’électricité (one); while lpg, 
used  primarily as a cooking and heating fuel in Moroccan households, remains 
heavily subsidised.
The reform clearly targeted those people who, supposedly, could afford 
higher prices: industrial consumers, factories, and car drivers. Finally, the gov-
ernment emphasised that price indexation offered a fair deal on both sides: 
prices could increase, but would also fall when international prices decreased. 
The Moroccan reform effort was not met with a public outcry, and subse-
quently went largely unnoticed by international media. Key to enabling this 
notable success has been two consecutive governments that, despite varying 
party interests, were willing and able to build the necessary coalitions to enact 
the price increases, despite opposing views within their own ranks. The coun-
try’s moderate Islamic party, the Parti de la justice et du développement (pjd), 
has notably been instrumental in rallying support for the reform, both within 
government and among the population. Morocco’s total subsidies—including 
food, which had peaked in 2012 at 6.6 per cent of gdp, fell to around 3.9 per 
cent of gdp in 2013 (Verme et al., 2014).
3.2 Yemen’s Failed Reform Efforts
Yemen illustrates the converse case, of domestic pricing reform efforts that 
have largely failed over several years. While these policies have been revised 
over time, in the most recent conflict they have proven to be additionally de-
stabilising in an already heated political situation. By the end of 2010, subsidies 
for liquid fuels, lpg, and electricity had usurped around a third of state spend-
ing, more than the country’s combined spending on health and education 
(Fattouh and El-Katiri, 2012b, 49). Yemen’s subsidies overwhelmingly benefited 
the country’s urban upper and middle classes, who have access to transport, 
17 For an example of how the French-speaking urban middle classes were targeted, see 
Agueniou (2013).
18 A study of some past Moroccan publications aimed at younger audiences illustrates the 
government’s line of argument. In Jeune Afrique, Ahmed Lahlimi, head of Morocco’s High 
Planning Commission, cited the volume of petroleum product subsidies across several 
North and sub-Saharan African countries, concluding ‘C’est effectivement problématique 
car cela représente autant d’investissements en moins pour le pays’. (Author’s translation: 
‘[“These amounts of expenditure on fuel subsidies”] are highly problematic since they 
represent foregone investment’) (Ballong, 2010).
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energy, and infrastructure links. Even today, around half the country (primar-
ily the former South and the geographically remote provinces across Yemen’s 
northern borders) lacks infrastructure; formal, price-controlled markets; and 
the ability to access the country’s highly subsidised electricity grid.19 Yemen’s 
severely deteriorating domestic security situation prior to and following the 
onset of the Arab Spring has led to a further deterioration in the country’s fi-
nances. An increasing number of attacks on its oil and gas infrastructure have 
halted the country’s hydrocarbon exports, adding to pre-existing domestic fuel 
shortages (mees, 2014i; Saeed, 2014; mees, 2014g).
Having had to import rising volumes of fuel products to cover shortfalls in 
domestic production, fiscal pressure on Yemen reached unprecedented levels; 
in a hasty and ill-prepared reform effort in July 2014, the country was forced 
(under intense pressure from lenders) to raise domestic energy prices. Amidst 
political turmoil, daily demonstrations in the streets of Sanaa and continued 
violent conflict between tribal groups and the central government in several 
provinces (many of which remain isolated from any electricity or fuel supply), 
the government’s decision to raise domestic energy prices was seen as a further 
failure by the state to provide for its citizens (Abdullah, 2014). Yemen’s weak 
central state has subsequently been unable to withstand pressure from non-
state groups—notably the Houthis—for a swift reversal of initial reform efforts 
(Security Council, 2014). This underlines the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
reforming energy pricing once a state has failed fiscally and politically and has 
lost its credibility, and once its citizens’ faith in its capabilities has collapsed.
Yemen’s case also illustrates the enormous challenges that the region’s weak 
states face in implementing subsidy reform. With the complex interrelation-
ship between energy subsidies and economic efficiency, and the difficulty of 
communicating the value of suffering short-term pain (removal of energy sub-
sidies) versus the desirability of achieving long-term gain (economic growth) to 
their populations, weak states are clearly in no position to reform energy subsi-
dies. Even more so when they are faced with the need to respond to fiscal pres-
sures, rather than being in a position to present a credible set of reforms that are 
aimed at improving people’s livelihoods over the medium and long term. This 
difficulty, experienced by Yemen, is reflected in other contexts. For instance, Al-
Khatteeb and Istepanian describe the fear of reform in the case of Iraq, writing:
There was and still remains a general fear among the Iraqi officials that 
any radical economic reforms, such as the elimination of subsidies for 
basic necessities like kerosene, cooking gas, electricity, and food rations 
19 El-Katiri and Fattouh (2011, 30–40) give an overview of access to electricity and different 
fuels across Yemen’s provinces and income groups.
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would be faced with strong opposition by the public and might cause 
widespread rioting, destabilizing an already fragile political process.
al-khatteeb and istepanian, �0�5, 4
3.3 Egypt’s 2014 Five-to-Midnight Reform
Egypt offers an interesting counterexample to the Yemeni case. Having expe-
rienced political turmoil as part of the Arab Spring through not one but two 
subsequent changes of government, in addition to transitory government 
and years of instability, Egypt has nevertheless carried out a series of fuel and 
electricity price reforms since the election of President General al-Sisi. Fiscal 
 pressure resulting from the country’s spending on subsidies has been the main 
factor pushing Egypt’s new government to engage in these reform efforts, de-
spite the risk of popular unrest.20
While Egypt’s July 2014 price hikes on most petroleum products were steep 
(up to 70 per cent price increases overnight),21 they have also been fairly suc-
cessful in reducing the country’s spending on oil subsidies (down to less than 7 
per cent of total government spending in the planned budget for 2015/16, from 
a figure of 20 per cent back in 2012/13) (mees, 2015).22 However, whilst spend-
ing on oil subsidies has fallen, spending on electricity subsidies has risen. Initial 
figures suggest that electricity subsidies are set to cost Egypt an estimated usd 
3.42 billion (egp 24.6 billion) for the fiscal year 2014/15, up 85 per cent on the 
2013/14 figure of usd 1.84 billion (egp 13.3 billion), though somewhat down on 
the original 2014/15 budget figure of usd 3.78 billion (egp 27.2 billion) (mees, 
2015). The process of phasing the subsidy out is thus likely to be lengthy, al-
though the government has been ambiguous on the timing and nature of 
future price rises.23 In addition, Egypt’s declining natural gas production has 
meant that the country has had to import growing volumes of internationally 
sourced lng, while natural gas continues to be sold to domestic consumers at 
prices far below the import cost.
20 For a background to Egypt’s unfolding energy problem during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, see Darbouche and Mabro (2011).
21 Diesel prices increased by 64%, gasoline 80 by 77%, and gasoline 92 by 41%. However, 
these prices are still very low by international standards. See mees (2014b).
22 Naturally, the decline in international prices for oil has also contributed towards this re-
duction in spending on subsidies.
23 According to the Financial Times the Egyptian government plans to phase out electricity 
subsidies over five years. The case of products is less clear, but the Minister of Planning 
has been quoted as saying that ‘In five years fuel will be offered at 80 per cent of its real 
cost to sections of the population which are deemed to need subsidies, the rest will pay 
market prices’. (Saleh, 2014).
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These recent reform measures are bold by any standard, especially so in light 
of the political and social instability still engulfing Egypt, and reveal the extent 
of fiscal pressures and the limited choices faced by the Egyptian government. 
Defying many analysts’ predictions, these price hikes, though very steep, have 
not resulted in mass protests and civil unrest.24 Part of the reason for this re-
lates to timing. The reform measures were announced following a wave of na-
tionalist fervour that saw President al-Sisi assume power, with strong support 
from his base for the onslaught against the Muslim Brotherhood. The violent 
crackdown on both the brotherhood and public protests may also have dis-
couraged people from demonstrating. With hopes for a more stable future, for 
many Egyptians the prospect of paying higher prices for energy was arguably 
the lesser evil compared with the disastrous economic consequences of yet 
more political turmoil. The al-Sisi government may also have benefited from a 
much higher level of credibility than previous governments, promising a fairer 
socio-economic system and tying the reform of fuel and electricity prices to 
the unmistakeable need for financial resources to be used on essential services 
such as health and education. President al-Sisi, and Prime Minister Ibrahim 
Mahlab have been key proponents of the reforms, and have been personally 
engaged in communicating their necessity, using a series of media interviews 
to emphasise the need for common sacrifices in order to make Egypt ‘great 
again’ (Al Bawaba, 2014; Mubashir Misr, 2014).
While such factors can partly explain the muted response on the streets, the 
energy reforms’ success will depend on the government’s ability to introduce 
measures to mitigate the impact of high energy prices for the most vulnerable 
groups in society. Some such measures have, indeed, been introduced—the 
government freezing the prices of publicly distributed bread, rice, sugar, tea, 
flour and oil. The government has also expanded the food subsidy system, ap-
plying discounts to the prices of additional products such as meat and chicken. 
The price of lpg (widely used by low-income households) was not raised in 
the latest wave of reforms. Yet despite these mitigating measures, there is deep 
frustration among Egypt’s low- and middle-income households related to the 
higher costs of living due to the price hikes. There is also scepticism about the 
government’s ability to translate savings made thanks to the reforms into real 
benefits for the population (Rashwan, 2014).
Although the Egyptian government can be relieved that its initial reform 
steps did not cause mass protests, the road is long and key challenges remain. 
24 There have been some small-scale protests and strikes (taxi drivers), but these were not 




Experience in other countries shows there is always the risk that the pace of re-
form slows down, or even that reforms are reversed. The government therefore 
needs to strengthen its currently highly ineffective social protection schemes 
and safety nets. For instance, in the case of ration cards, the World Bank has 
found that eligibility criteria (such as being retired or a public sector employee) 
are not pro-poor, leaving poor Egyptians less eligible for a high-subsidy ration 
card than are non-poor Egyptians. Also, these regressive eligibility criteria are 
not well enforced—more than two-thirds of those holding high-subsidy ration 
cards do not meet the requisite criteria to do so.25 The Egyptian  government 
also has to establish credible commitments, including measures in areas such 
as public transport and infrastructure investment, laying the ground for the 
sound implementation of future price reforms.
Another issue to consider in the Egyptian case is the continued level of reg-
ulatory intervention in energy markets as a whole, given that Egypt has been 
adjusting prices on an ad hoc basis with no apparent plan in mind for future 
reform steps. One rationale for the current wave of reforms is that it will pro-
vide the government with the fiscal space needed to increase investment in 
public infrastructure and improve key services. In the absence of regular price 
adjustments, however, fluctuations in international energy prices may quickly 
erode current fiscal gains, further reducing the funds available for mitigation 
measures and public investment. For instance, the savings Egypt has made in 
the area of oil subsidies have partly resulted from the collapse of international 
oil prices since July 2014. Higher prices would reverse some of these savings 
and could force the government to adjust prices by engaging in highly visible 
political interventions, rather than by applying an automatic mechanism that 
helps reduce fuel subsidies.
3.4 The Iranian Reform Experience
Iran’s targeted subsidy reform, initiated in 2010, is one of the most interest-
ing cases the region has to offer. It is all the more significant as it has been 
conducted by a large oil and gas producing state that has, in the past, been 
perceived to be the most immune to calls for the rationalisation of domestic 
energy prices. The reform followed more than a decade of political controversy 
with regards to Iran’s domestic oil prices, which were then among the lowest in 
the world. Surging domestic demand for energy, following more than a decade 
25 Households in the top quintile receive subsidies of around 20% on the rationed products, 
compared with less than 16% for the lowest quintile. In terms of coverage, a third of the 
poor do not have ration cards, excluding them from the benefits of ration card subsidies. 
(World Bank, 2005).
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of international sanctions that had severely affected Iran’s ability to produce 
from its enormous reserve base, had left the world’s largest reserve holder of 
natural gas reliant on top-up imports to avoid power shortages and load shed-
ding. Iran’s domestic subsidy burden, measured on the basis of opportunity 
cost, was estimated to be around usd 100 billion by 2010, an amount that ex-
ceeded the country’s annual revenues from oil exports—at the time—of usd 
70–80 billion (Guillaume et al., 2011, 4; Energy Compass, 2011; Tabatabai, 2011).
Iran’s initial energy subsidy reform step, in December 2010, was estimated 
to have removed around usd 50–60 billion worth of subsidies (around 15 
per cent of gdp) based on average 2010 international selling prices; this was 
achieved by dramatically raising the prices of such items as gasoline (300 per 
cent), natural gas (50 per cent), and diesel (900 per cent), virtually overnight 
(Energy Compass, 2011; Argus, 2013a). Within five years (coinciding with the 
country’s Five-Year Plan) Iran’s domestic energy prices should have risen to 90 
per cent of their international market value. The architects of Iran’s subsidy 
reform have been clear that price increases should be meaningful, in order to 
reduce demand effectively. Moreover, as outlined by some observers:
… relatively small domestic price increases could be rapidly eroded in 
real term by domestic inflation, an increase in international prices, or 
exchange rate depreciation.
guillaume et al., �0��, ��
Finally, a front-loaded reform resulting in fast, large savings was a key require-
ment for the implementation of the Iranian government’s single most impor-
tant mitigation effort—a compensatory cash transfer system.
An essential part of Iran’s strategy from the beginning was the redistribution, 
via cash grants, of proceeds generated by the reforms to different elements in 
the economy. Initial plans in 2010/11 included specific allocation targets: 30 per 
cent to domestic industries, in cash, to help them adjust to a gradually higher 
pricing environment (enabling energy efficiency-enhancing investments); 20 
per cent to government institutions for similar adjustments; and 50 per cent 
to citizens, in the form of cash grants, to compensate households for generally 
higher living costs (Guillaume et al., 2011, 10). An initial plan to target lower- 
income households with these cash transfers proved unworkable, so the gov-
ernment moved on to a universal cash transfer system with sums paid per adult 
to the head of each household. The sum—on average usd 180 for a household 
of four during the first six months of the reform—amounted to around half of 
the nation’s minimum wage: a substantial benefit, particularly for those on low 
incomes (Tabatabai, 2011, 15).
El-Katiri and Fattouh78
<UN>
To further reduce the risk of widespread protest following these bold price 
rises, Iran’s reform efforts were accompanied by a meticulously planned and 
executed public communication strategy, run by a government-appointed 
spokesman. Iranian news media (television, radio, websites and newspapers) 
and political, business, and social leaders and academics were all mobilised 
to speak in favour of the reform and to outline its many benefits to Iranian 
society. The campaign placed special emphasis on the background to the 
transformation—the enormous waste of Iranian natural and financial resources 
caused by the subsidy regime and the fact that the rich rather than the poor 
benefited most. The expected gains were also explained in detail—a universal 
cash transfer benefiting many poor households (Guillaume et al., 2011, 17–19; 
 Tabatabai, 2011, 18–19). The entire communication strategy emphasised the 
shift of subsidies from products to people, a policy that would improve social 
equity, industrial competitiveness and economic diversification. To further 
counter the risks associated with the reform, the government widely adver-
tised its policy of actively using monetary policy to counteract inflationary 
risks; prior to the reform, it also built up large stockpiles of basic goods to avoid 
bunkering and panic buying (Guillaume et al., 2011, 11).
Iran’s subsidy reform has not been without complications. International 
sanctions (tightened significantly, and acting as a considerable restriction on 
oil exports since mid-2012), and the accompanying steep fall in the country’s 
currency exchange rate, have created a surge in Iranian living costs and signifi-
cantly complicated the efforts towards transformation; a second phase of the 
subsidy reform, planned for October 2012, has been suspended (mees, 2012b).
In the run-up to presidential elections in 2013, the clear political value of 
Iran’s cash transfer system also meant that the system—intended only initially 
to be universal—became a major issue in a political tug of war between differ-
ent camps. Iranian politicians and oil and gas business leaders criticised the 
country for continuing to pay near-universal cash transfers that the system was 
increasingly unable to afford—the popularity of the scheme had seen the gov-
ernment keep handing out universal transfers at levels that soon exceeded the 
net savings it was making, with little left for other intended recipients such as 
industry.26
A new round of price increases, coupled with a reduction in monthly 
cash transfers to households, was initiated in early 2014, with the intention 
26 Iran’s Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, has vociferously criticised Iran’s cash transfer 
system, saying the Iranian oil and gas sector (from which the majority of revenues for the 
system come) could not afford to pay the handouts that were increasingly threatening 
domestic, upstream and refining companies’ development projects (Argus, 2013a; Argus, 
2013b).
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of achieving combined savings of around usd 19.1 billion in the Iranian year 
2014/15 (mees, 2014c; mees, 2014d).
A systematic evaluation of the impact of Iran’s price reform on consump-
tion is difficult due to the presence of various other factors including the inten-
sification of international sanctions against the country in mid-2012; sanctions 
that have affected Iran’s oil exports. Furthermore, demand for electricity, and 
for natural gas in particular, are highly supply-driven, implying that shortfalls 
in the supply of these commodities in some provinces may translate into re-
duced demand growth even where price effects would not have indicated a 
steep fall in consumption. Among Iranian observers, some general agreement 
has emerged that the initial energy price rises in 2010 reduced fuel product and 
natural gas demand significantly in the following months, although the effect 
in subsequent months is less clear (iod, 2011; Amuzegar, 2012). The main les-
son to draw from the Iranian case, however, is the political feasibility of even a 
radical reform process if it is accompanied by sufficient planning, and makes 
use of an approach that provides a credible reform framework in the form of 
government commitments to facilitating the switch towards greater energy ef-
ficiency, coupled to a well-designed mitigation scheme that offers cash, rather 
than in-kind, benefits.
4 Conclusions
The reform of energy subsidies in mena remains an economically and politi-
cally delicate task, one from which many of the region’s governments still shy 
away, for several reasons. The Arab Spring has added a further, interesting vari-
able to the region’s energy subsidy dilemma, for it has instilled in many of the 
region’s governments an even greater fear of the Arab street, including in coun-
tries that have remained largely unaffected by the political turmoil that has un-
folded across the region since late 2010. Initially a complicating factor that has 
significantly delayed plans for energy pricing reform in the region since that 
turmoil began, the lessons of the Arab Spring could also provide an important 
underlying measurement against which governments can systematically reas-
sess the way they spend national resources within their domestic economies, 
and a way of both the poor and the middle class receiving a better deal than 
has been offered in the past.27
27 Some recent, country-focused papers have started to explore various avenues for change 
(Kandil, 2010; Verme et al. 2014; World Bank, 2011). Verme et al. (2014) specifically model 
the effect a further subsidy reduction, combined with a universal cash grant, could have 
on poverty levels in Morocco.
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In the short term, however, rather than questions of wider social justice, 
the energy subsidy reform agenda in mena will likely be dominated by ques-
tions of fiscal sustainability. The manner in which the fiscal burden of energy 
subsidies has spiralled out of control in recent years will render their reform 
increasingly unavoidable in a growing number of mena economies—mainly 
energy importers and small-sized oil and gas producers such as Jordan, Leba-
non, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. This is undoubtedly the most unsatisfactory path 
towards reform, and the long-term success of current policies—most of which 
have been implemented on an ad hoc basis under pressure from international 
lending organisations at times of severely compromised government capac-
ity in a number of conflict-ridden mena states—stands in marked contrast to 
the more desirable objective of comprehensively overhauling social security 
and equity issues throughout the mena region. Striking the right balance be-
tween these parallel objectives will undoubtedly prove critical to determining 
the eventual success of energy subsidy reform, beyond mere fiscal savings for 
cash-strapped governments.
The importance of government credibility and capacity to mitigate the neg-
ative effects of energy subsidy reform on domestic customers has been made 
painfully clear in cases where energy price reforms have led to counterproduc-
tive outcomes, which has been the case—for example—in Yemen. The Yemeni 
case, as well as positive examples of reform efforts in countries such as Jordan, 
Morocco, Egypt and Iran, suggests that it is better to reform energy subsidies 
before a political or economic crisis point is reached. The fiscal discipline re-
quired for such endeavours may still prevent many mena governments from 
initiating such comprehensive fiscal reform efforts proactively, and without 
immediate pressure from international lending bodies. In the medium and 
long terms, however, rationalising the way in which energy and fiscal resources 
are spent domestically will become an ever more critical element in ensuring 
the political and economic stability that these states ultimately seek.
The Iranian example is an important one, as it has demonstrated that a re-
form of domestic energy pricing can be economically and politically feasible 
for large oil and gas producers. Iran’s unique features—including a large, het-
erogeneous population and geography, relatively large gaps between rich and 
poor, and additional complicating factors such as the presence of intensify-
ing international sanctions—further strengthen the country’s experience as a 
case in point. Many of the Gulf ’s other oil and gas producers—wealthy both in 
absolute and per capita terms—are equipped with even more powerful fiscal 
resources with which to enact the necessary mitigation measures to ensure a 
more rational use of their valuable oil and gas resources over the long term. 
In this context, the uae’s August 2015 move to deregulate domestic fuel prices 
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sends an encouraging message in view both of the consistency with which the 
reform has been carried out, and the complete absence of any political turmoil 
during the first round of gasoline price increases (of up to almost 25 per cent) 
(The National, 2015). In view of the need for many more of the region’s govern-
ments to accommodate the rising economic and political aspirations of their 
populations (which are becoming increasingly younger and better educated), 
the reform of energy pricing mechanisms, together with the provision of more 
effectively targeted benefits for their citizens, should arguably be an urgent 
priority for many mena countries.
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